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I. INTRODUCTION
From an American perspective, Toronto may seem like the kind
of walkable, transit-oriented city beloved by critics of automobile-de-
pendent suburbia. Toronto has extensive subways- and commuter
train 2 services, and therefore higher transit ridership than most other
Canadian and American cities.3 While some North American down-
* Associate Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law. B.A., Wesleyan University;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania; L.L.M., University of Toronto.
1. See JoN SEWELL, THE SHAPE OF THE SUBURBS: UNDERSTANDING TOROlrO's SPRAWL
86 (Univ. of Toronto Press 2009). (Showing map of existing and planned subway lines).
2. Id. at 79 (map of commuter train lines).
3. See JOHN LORINC, THE NEW CITY 100, 231 (The Penguin Group 2008) (breaking
down ridership by distance from downtown. In five of the six categories listed, Toronto had
highest ridership of eight Canadian cities listed; for example, 53.3 percent of commuters
living within five kilometers of work used public transit while in other cities listed, transit
"market share" ranged from 14.8 percent to 44.7 percent; transit "market share" of
commuters more than twice as high in Canada as in the United States).
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towns have languished in recent decades,4 some of Toronto's downtown
neighborhoods are more prosperous than the rest of the city.5
Yet Toronto has experienced considerable sprawl (that is, auto-
mobile-dependent suburban development). 6 The population of
metropolitan Toronto doubled in the second half of the 20th century7 ,
but the amount of land consumed by metropolitan Toronto more than
tripled, increasing from 193 square miles in the 1950s to 656 in the
1990s.8 Because newer suburbs are far less dense than the old city of
Toronto, suburbanites are far more likely than urbanites to drive to
most destinations, arguably increasing traffic congestion and air pollu-
tion. 9 In addition, low-density development arguably increases the
costs of some public services- because where lots are large, service ve-
hicles have to travel further to reach the same number of houses.10
Why did Toronto sprawl? Some commentators argue "urban
sprawl merely represents the results of the free market economy.""
However, in The Shape of the Suburbs, former Toronto Mayor John
Sewelll 2 explains that Toronto has sprawled at least partially because
of a series of sprawl-inducing policy decisions. This review essay ad-
dresses the issues that Sewell focuses on: transportation, water/sewer
infrastructure, and (to a lesser extent) land use regulation.' 3 This re-
4. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 907, 592 P.2d 341, 345
(1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). ("central business districts apparently have continued to
yield their functions more and more to suburban centers.").
5. See Coming By-Elections, GLOBE AND MAIL, January 30, 2008, at 10A, 2008 WLNR
1720655. (in downtown Toronto parliamentary district, "the average family income of
$124,082 is the third highest in Canada.").
6. See Michael Lewyn, You Can Have It All: Less Sprawl And Property Rights Too, 80
TEMPLE L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2007) (defining sprawl as development that is both automobile-
oriented and far from urban cores).
7. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 159.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 160-62. See also LoINC, supra note 3, at 107 (in core of Toronto, 49 percent
of households owned one or more cars, as opposed to 87 percent in inner suburbs and 96
percent in outer suburbs). But see OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY 93-94, 113-15
(Island Press 2002) (noting that there is some dispute over whether negative effects of
increased car travel are outweighed by positive effects of lower density, since densely
populated urban centers tend to be more congested than suburbs; author concludes,
however, that even dense areas would be less congested if suburbanites drove less).
10. SEWELI, supra note 1, at 163. But see Amy Helling, Advocate For A Modern Devil:
Can Sprawl Be Defended?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1063, 1068-69 (2001) (utility expenditures
in low-density areas may be lower than in more compact neighborhoods since low-density
areas sometimes have fewer public services).
11. Gregory V. Jolivette, Ja., Kelo v. City of New London: A Reduction of Property
Rights But A Tool To Combat Urban Sprawl, 55 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 103, 107 (2007).
12. SEWELL, supra note 1, at ix (noting author's background).
13. I note [in] passing that Sewell does not address every government policy favoring
suburbanization: for example, he does not focus on federal housing subsidies favoring
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view also discusses Sewell's critique of current regional attempts to
control sprawl. Finally, it compares Toronto's policies to those of
American cities.
II. SPRWL IN TORONTO
Sewell asserts that the provincial government of Ontario (the
Canadian province that includes Toronto)14 and Toronto-area munici-
pal governments have facilitated sprawl by supporting the
construction of highways and sewers in suburbia.15 In addition, local
land use regulation has favored low-density development. 16
A. Highways and Transit
1. Creating Sprawl Through Highways
Toronto's local and provincial planners have generally favored
highway construction. In 1927, the province of Ontario began to subsi-
dize suburban road construction; the province paid 40 percent of the
cost of road construction and 20 percent of the cost of road mainte-
nance.1 7 In addition, the province required the city of Toronto to help
pay for suburban roads, on the ground that city-generated traffic led to
suburbia.18
In 1942, the city created the Toronto City Planning Board19
which adopted a plan proposing six new expressways.20 The Toronto
City Council formally endorsed the plan in 1944,21 and many of these
highways were, in fact, built. For example, the Toronto-Barrie High-
way, also known as Highway 40022, was open by 195923 as was the
sprawl. Cf RICHARD HARRIS, CREEPING CONFORMITY 132-33 (2004) (Canadian federal
government favored suburban sprawl by financing construction of new housing which
tended to be suburban).
14. Cf Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the
Quest for Governmental Status, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409, 429-39 (2006) (describing
Ontario legislation limiting powers of Toronto and other cities).
15. See infra Parts II-A, I-B.
16. See infra Part I-C.
17. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 14.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 30.
20. Id. at 33.
21. Id. at 34.
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 64 (highway "recently opened" by 1959).
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Toronto Bypass 24, also known as Highway 401.25 These new highways
made it easier for suburban commuters to access downtown, thus en-
couraging additional suburban development. 26 As a result, the new
highways soon became crammed with suburban commuters. For ex-
ample, the Toronto Bypass was planned to accommodate 35,000
vehicles per day but by 1961 it was used by 70,000 vehicles per day.2 7
Nevertheless, Ontario's provincial government 28 continued to
build highways into the hinterlands beyond Toronto. Don Valley Park-
way, opened in the 1960s, 29 was extended into Toronto's northern
suburbs as Highway 404 a decade later.30 Highway 427, west of the
city,8 1 opened in 1972.32 During the 1980s,33 the province built High-
way 410 to Brampton, a city northwest of Toronto,3 4 as well as
Highway 407, also north of the city.3 5
Ontario built these highways in order to relieve congestion 36
but their impact on congestion was, at best, unclear. Sewell notes that
by the 1990s, 70 percent of the Toronto-area highway system was con-
gested at peak periods.3 7  As government built expressways to
suburbia, those suburbs and their roads filled up with cars.38
It could be argued that the relationship between highways and
sprawl is purely coincidental because commuters would naturally pre-
fer the extra living space and cheaper land of suburbia, regardless of
24. Id.
25. Id. at 63.
26. Id. at 64 ("New highways signaled that the fringes could now easily access
downtown, and development proceeded accordingly.").
27. Id. at 67.
28. In Canada, provinces are primarily responsible for highway finance. Id. at 63
("roads constituted the largest source of provincial spending" in the 1950s), 70 ("the
expressway system that the province had built was its key planning tool."). See infra notes
81-82 and accompanying text (describing provincial highway plans for coming decades).
29. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 67.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 70.
33. See Allison Jones, Lightning Strikes Leaves Two Young Boys Clinging to Life,
GUELPH MERCURY August 13, 2009, at A6, 2009 WLNR 15749851 (Brampton "45 kilometres
northwest of Toronto"). 45 kilometres is roughly comparable to 25-30 miles. See Goh Yihan,
Tort Law in the Face of Land Scarcity in Singapore, 26 Aiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 339
(2009) (42 kilometres equal to 26 miles).
34. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 70.
35. Id. at 57, 72.
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 74.
38. Id. at 70-71, 74 (suggesting that auto-oriented suburban design actually increased
congestion by increasing driving).
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convenience.39 But this argument proves too much: if transportation
facilities did not affect where people lived every suburb would be as
populous as it is today, even if it was accessible only through two-lane
dirt roads- obviously an absurd result. Moreover, surveys of homeown-
ers show that many homeowners prefer locations with highway
access 40 which means that in the absence of such access, many suburbs
would be less popular with homeowners.
In sum, Sewell shows that Toronto-area governments actively
favored sprawl by building highways that made suburbanization more
convenient; moreover, it is unclear whether these highways succeeded
in their goal of reducing traffic congestion.
2. Transit Responds To Sprawl
Highway-oriented development adversely affected public
transit. When Toronto's suburbs began to grow, its transit policymak-
ers were faced with a choice: either to refuse to build public transit to
those suburbs (thus ensuring that those suburbs became completely
automobile-dependent) 41 or to bring suburbanites into the transit sys-
tem by expanding suburban transit service.
Toronto's transit agencies chose the latter option, reducing
fares for suburban riders42 and expanding service to suburban areas. 43
The results of this policy were mixed. On the one hand, transit rider-
ship rose throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 4 4 But because Toronto's
39. Cf ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 10-11 (2005) (sprawl a
result of increased affluence), 108 (suggesting that highways helped American cities
because American mayors originally supported them).
40. See Ralph Bivins, Las Vegas To Get Metropolis Condo Transplant, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Mar. 30, 2003, at 8, 2003 WLNR 16439507 ("The most important characteristic
of a housing community is convenient highway access, according to a recent survey of home
buyers. Forty-four percent of buyers surveyed ranked highways as a very important
characteristic, said the survey conducted by the National Association of Home Builders.");
Michael Lewyn, Campaign of Sabotage: Big Government's War Against Public
Transportation, 26 COLUM. J. ENvWL. L. 259, 272-73 (2001) ("in 1999 the National
Association of Home Builders (which favors increased road spending) conducted a survey
that asked respondents what amenities would encourage them to move to a new area;
respondents' top choice (endorsed by fifty-five percent of respondents) was 'highway
access'.") (citations omitted).
41. As has occurred in many American suburbs. See Margery Austin Turner, Limits on
Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Housing
Markets, 41 IND. L. J. 797, 810-11 (2008) ("Nearly half of all low-skill jobs in the white
suburbs are inaccessible by public transportation.").
42. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 82.
43. Id. at 77, 83-84 (citing examples).
44. Id. at 79 (ridership on Toronto Transit Commission, or TTC, transit vehicles
increased from 324 million in 1970 to 460 million in 1990), 78 (GO Transit commuter rail
3032011
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suburbs were less dense and more automobile-dependent than To-
ronto's older areas, 45 suburban rail lines had fewer riders (and thus
less revenue) per mile than urban lines.46
According to Sewell, the added expense of suburban service
made the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), the region's leading
transit provider,47 less financially viable.48 In 1970, the TTC ran a
surplus.49 But as suburban transit service expanded, TTC's deficit rose
to $275 million in 1991.50 As a result of these deficits and a recession
during the 1990s, TTC sought to save money by reducing service on
urban transit routes and raising fares, thus ultimately reducing rider-
ship from 460 million in 1990 to less than 400 million in 1994.51
According to Sewell, highway-generated sprawl encouraged
TTC to bring more service to suburbia, causing TTC's costs to increase
and ultimately reducing urban transit service in the long run. Thus,
Toronto's suburban highways both encouraged migration to Toronto's
suburbs and led to reduced public transit service for people who chose
to stay in urban Toronto.
B. Sewer and Water
Sewell explains that although roads enable suburban growth,
"that growth does not actually occur until water and sewage services
service, which serve suburbs to a greater extent than TTC vehicles, had 4 million riders in
1969 and 25 million in 1985).
45. Id. at 80-81. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining why low-density
areas are more dependent on automobiles).
46. Id. at 78 (noting that GO Transit ran larger deficits than Toronto Transit
Commission). Cf Daniel Girard & Tess Kalinowski, The genuinely better way; Slogans
won't lure the transit-leery, but shining customer service could, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 14,
2008, at A07 2008 WLNR 6943737 (in Toronto, public transit has 175 yearly rides per
capita, as opposed to 40 for suburban Mississauga).
47. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 78-79 (TTC ridership far higher than GO Transit; at start
of 1970s, for example, TTC had 324 million riders and GO Transit had 4 million and the gap
narrowed only slightly in later decades).
48. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
49. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 14.
50. Id. at 82. But even now, Toronto transit is closer to paying for itself than more
sparsely used American transit systems. See Transit In Canada at a Crossroads, http:l
www.roadsbridges.com/Transit-in-Canada-at-a-Crossroads-article3725 (Toronto transit
revenues cover 80 percent of costs, compared to Canadian average of 63 percent and U.S.
average of 36 percent) (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).
51. Id. at 87. However, TTC regained much of this lost ground during the 21st century.
See Danna Zabrovsky, TTC Posts Record Year for Ridership: 470 Million Trips, http://
network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/toronto/archive/2009/05/27/ttc-posts-record-year-for-
ridership-470-million-trips.aspx (discussing recent ridership increases) (last visited Aug. 17,
2009).
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are in place."5 2 In the 1940s, the absence of water and sewer services
impeded suburban growth: for example, in one Toronto suburb, 20 per-
cent of homes used outhouses.53 But in 1957, the government of
Ontario established the Ontario Water Resources Commission
(OWRC) to improve public services in growing areas of that province. 54
In 1965, the provincial government announced that through the
OWRC it would fund sewage and water services for some of Toronto's
existing suburbs and for proposed development sites55 - even sites that
were not slated for development under the region's land use plans.56
Although OWRC was willing to charge suburbs for water and
sewer service, its rates were not break-even rates. Therefore, OWRC
effectively subsidized suburban development.57 By contrast, the city of
Toronto and its older suburbs financed their own water and sewage
services with minimal provincial assistance.58
Sewell notes that because the province assumed financial re-
sponsibility for water and sewer service, it "freed municipalities from
having to worry about whether the development they were approving
could sustain the cost of the infrastructure."5 9 Thus, government-sub-
sidized water and sewer service encouraged suburban development
both by making suburban land more desirable to developers and poten-
tial homeowners, and by encouraging municipalities to approve
development of such land.
C. Not Just Sprawl, But Low-Density Sprawl
As early as 1943, Toronto's planners sought to limit density in
newly developed suburbs; the city's 1943 plan stated that a suitable
density for those suburbs would be 10,000 people per square mile, half
the density of existing Toronto neighborhoods.6 0 Ultimately, suburban
Toronto became even less dense, with 8,000 residents per square mile
in Toronto's older suburbs and 4,700 in the developed portion of To-
52. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 94.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 97.
55. Id. at 106.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 110 (noting Ontario Premier Bill Davis' admission that suburban water and
sewer service "was heavily subsidized, no question."). See also id. at 68 (noting Davis'
position).
58. Id. at 127.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 33.
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ronto's suburban fringes. 6' Most of this new growth has taken place at
a density between six and ten residential units per acre,62 as opposed
to 20-30 units per acre in Toronto's older residential neighborhoods. 63
Job density was also lower in suburbia; the portion of Toronto lying
within the city's pre-1945 boundaries has 49 residents and jobs per ur-
banized acre, as opposed to 23 in the region as a whole and nine in
suburbs such as Vaughan and Richmond Hill.6 4
Low-density areas tend to be automobile-dependent because if
each block has only a few residences, only a few people can walk to
nearby destinations. For example, imagine that there is a transit stop
on Street X, and that residents of Street X and nearby streets are will-
ing to walk five blocks to the transit stop. If each block has five
commuters, only 25 residents of each nearby street can walk to the
transit stop. But if each block has 20 commuters, 100 residents per
street can walk to the transit stop.65
Sewell's discussion of density is far skimpier than his discussion
of transportation issues; a more complete book would have discussed in
detail the extent to which low suburban densities were a result of gov-
ernment regulation as opposed to consumer preferences for low-density
development. However, he does cite one instructive example of anti-
density government regulation. In the late 1980s, a local developer
proposed a development called the Heart of Springdale, with 20 dwell-
ing units per acre and apartments over shops.66 Municipal planning
staff vetoed the project.67
In fact, Toronto-area suburbs do restrict density. For example,
the village of Nobleton, part of suburban King Township68 , limits den-
sity to new residential areas to two units per acre.69 This limitation is
61. Id. at 159.
62. Id. at 158.
63. Id. at 220. Sewell's "20-30 per acre" figure refers to three neighborhoods which,
according to Sewell, are "known for their houses", implying that densities are higher in
other neighborhoods less dominated by single-family homes.
64. Id.
65. LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1106-07 (explaining relationship between density and
walkability in more detail).
66. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 158.
67. Id. Sewell notes that the staff was concerned that the development's proposed
streets were too narrow. Id. This issue is closely related to density, since land used for wider
streets cannot be used for housing, and so wider streets reduce neighborhood density.
68. Id. at 172 (map showing King as one of Toronto's suburbs); Nobleton Community
Plan, http://www.king.calfiles/documents/Nobleton%20Consolidation.pdf (front page notes
that Nobleton part of King) (last visited Aug. 18, 2009).
69. Id. at 11.
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far below the density normally required to support public transit.70
Similarly, in the outer Toronto suburb of Burlington,7 'houses in the
city's least dense zone must consume at least 1850 meters, or 0.46
acres, of land. 72
Toronto suburbs also indirectly reduce density through mini-
mum parking requirements. An example is Richmond Hill, a Toronto
suburb,73 which requires office buildings to provide 3.2 parking spaces
per 100 square meters74 This requirement equates to roughly 3 spaces
per 1000 square feet.75 These rules are not limited to commercial ar-
eas. For instance, in the Toronto suburb of Markham,7 6 apartment
buildings must provide more parking spaces than dwelling units.77
Land that is used for parking lots cannot be used for housing or com-
70. See Reid Ewing, Florida's Growth Management Learning Curve, 19 VA. ENVTL L.J.
375, 386 (2000) (providing that density of four to seven units per acre can support hourly
bus service, seven to fifteen units per acre may support more frequent bus service, and
twenty units per acre or more required to support "high-capacity transit").
71. See Geoffrey York, Before Madonna's Babies, There was Idaho, GLOBE AND MAIL,
June 22, 2009, at Al, 2009 WLNR 11895708 (describing Burlington as "outer suburb" of
Toronto).
72. See Zoning By-Law 2020, Part 2- Residential Zones, at 12, http://cms.burlington.cal
AssetFactory.aspx?did=10512 (last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (requiring 1850 meters in most
rural zones); Boaz Green, Drawing a Green Line: The Potential for an Environmental
Challenge to Israel's Separation Barrier, 10 UCLA INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 503, 505 n. 11
(2005) (1,000 square meters equals one-fourth of an acre). If 1,000 square meters equals .25
of an acre, 1,850 square meters equals .4625 of an acre.
73. See Lifetime Learning Inc. v. Richmond Hill Country Club, (2000), 30 R.P.R. (3d)
85 at para. 1 (Ontario Superior Court 2000) (Richmond Hill "a suburb of Toronto").
74. See High Street Dev. v. Richmond Hill, 2009 CarswellOnt 5863, (Ontario Municipal
Board) at Attachment 2.
75. I calculate as follows: one square meter is identical to 10.6 square feet. See Vann
Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville, (2003), 3 S.C.R. 158, at para. 2, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 118 (7.5 square
meters identical to 80 square feet). Thus, 100 square meters is identical to about 1066
square feet. Thus, the rule in question requires 3.2 parking spaces per 1066 square feet
which is identical to 3 spaces per 1000 square feet. I note that this requirement is more
lenient than is most American parking regulation. See DONALD SHoup, THE HIGH COST OF
FREE PARKING 31 (2005) (office buildings typically required to provide four parking spaces
per 1000 square feet).
76. See Honest Ed's v. Imbrogno, (2006), 58 C.P.R. (4th) 168, at para. 3 (Markham "a
suburb of Toronto").
77. See 1691126 Ontario Inc. v. Markham, 2009 CarswellOnt 3888 (Ontario Municipal
Board), at Attachment 2, Part 3.2.3 (approving plan requiring 1.1 parking spaces per
dwelling unit without any distinction between units designed for one person and those
designed to house more people and despite the fact that plan intended "to implement the
transit-supportive policies of the approved policy framework"). See also Dundas Sixth Line
Dev. v. Oakville, 2009 CarswellOnt 3292 (Ontario Municipal Board), at Attachment 2 (1.25
parking spaces per unit). I note, however, that some cities are less stringent than Markham.
Toronto typically requires only 0.5 parking spaces per one-bedroom multifamily dwelling
unit and 0.75 spaces per two-bedroom unit. See Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp.
v. Bloor/Avenue Road Investment Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 5078 at para. 32.
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merce. Thus, minimum parking requirements artificially reduce
population and employment density.
It appears that suburban Toronto's low density requirements
are, in part, due to municipal regulation. However, a full discussion of
this point awaits a book more complete than Sewell's work.
D. The Future of Sprawl
In 2005, Ontario's government passed enabling legislation for
the region's "Places to Grow" plan.78 At first glance, "Places to Grow"
seems designed to curb sprawl; for example, the plan creates a green-
belt around Toronto and provides that land inside the greenbelt can
not be used for suburban development.79 The plan also mandates that
40 percent of new development occur within already urbanized areas8 o
and endorses expansion of public transit.81 The plan has attracted con-
siderable attention; for example, in 2006 the American Planning
Association gave Ontario an award honoring the plan.8 2
Sewell examines the details of Ontario's plan more closely and
reveals that it is unlikely to significantly reduce sprawl for three rea-
sons. First, "Places to Grow" sets aside 200,000 hectares of land (or
approximately 500,000 acres)8 3 for future development- enough land to
accommodate all development for the next quarter century,84 including
three-fourths of the region's prime farmland.85
Second, Ontario's "40 percent" requirement is toothless. During
the 1990s, 43 percent of all Toronto-area development had occurred on
already-urbanized land.8 6 Thus, the "40 percent" rule merely replicates
existing development rather than steering development towards ex-
isting areas.
Third, what the Ontario government gives with land use regula-
tion, it takes with infrastructure policy. Although the province plans
to expand public transit,87 it also proposes to expand the Toronto re-
78. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 221.
79. Id. at 224.
80. Id. at 223.
81. Id. at 225-26.
82. Id. at 222.
83. A hectare is equivalent to 2.5 acres. See Robert DeLay, Our Post-Kyoto Climate
Change Framework: Open Market Carbon-Ranching as Smart Development, 17 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 73 (2008).
84. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 223.
85. Id. at 224.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 225-26.
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gion's highway system by extending Highways 404, 407 and 427
further into suburbia.8 8 In addition, the province proposes to add lanes
to Highway 403 and 404.89
Thus, "Places to Grow" is unlikely to slow Toronto's sprawl and
may actually accelerate sprawl through highway expansions. In other
words, "Places to Grow" should have been titled "Business as Usual."
III. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
How do Toronto's urban planning policies compare with those of
most American cities and states? At first glance, Toronto seems identi-
cal to most American cities. Just as Toronto has built sprawl-
spreading highways,90 so have most American cities. As early as 1927,
American state and local governments spent more money on highways
than on any government function other than education.91 The Ameri-
can federal government has supported highways since 1916,92 but did
not begin to support public transit until the 1960s.9 3 Today, the fed-
eral government spends four times as much on highways as on public
transit.94 In the United States, as in Ontario, these highways have en-
abled sprawl as people and jobs have moved to land near highway
interchanges.95 Highways make suburbs near highways more popular
because home buyers highly value highway access: for example, a 2002
survey conducted for the National Association of Home Builders
88. Id. at 226 (describing regional plan), 228 (map of highway extensions).
89. Id. at 226.
90. See supra Part II-A.
91. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 380 n. 149 (1990).
92. See Chad Emerson, All Sprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has
Driven Unsustainable Growth, 75 TENN. L. REV. 411, 432-37 (2008) (describing 1916 Act and
subsequent legislation).
93. See Mandy B. Seuffert, Caught in A Cement Spider Web: Proposed Suburban
Transportation Policies to Architecting Less Automobile Reliant Communities, 15 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 307 (2007) (federal aid to public transit began with Urban Mass Transit
Act of 1964).
94. See Budget in Brief 2010, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2010/bib2010.htm#fta (in
2008, federal government spent just over $50 billion on Federal Highway Administration
and $10.5 billion on Federal Transit Administration; 2010 Obama budget proposes $41.8
billion for former and $10.3 billion for latter); Philip A. Hummel, Next Stop- A Cleaner and
Healthier Environment: Global Strategies to Improve Public Transit, 35 TRANs. L.J. 263, 282
(2008) (in recent decades, federal government has consistently spent more than four times
as much on highways as on public transit).
95. LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1106-07.
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showed that recent home buyers ranked highway access above any
other amenity listed.96
Just as Ontario has subsidized water and sewer service in new
suburbs,97 so have most American state governments. Although urban
governments built their own sewer systems in the 19th century, state
governments typically subsidized new suburban sewer systems in the
20th century.98 In the 1950s, the federal government began to support
suburban sewer projects as well.99
And in both Toronto and in American cities, local zoning codes
reduce density' 00 - directly through limitations on the number of dwell-
ing units per acre' 0 and indirectly through minimum parking
requirements that require landowners to use land for parking instead
of for housing.102
But Toronto and its core suburbs are far more compact than
most American cities and suburbs. Toronto's pre-World War II core
has 20,000 people per square mile, its inner suburbs have 8000 people
per square mile, and its most recently developed suburbs have 4700
people per square mile.'os By contrast, nearly all American cities are
less dense than Toronto's core, and many are less dense than its sub-
urbs. Within the fourteen largest U.S. metropolitan areas, only one
central city (New York) has over 20,000 people per square mile.104 Six
of these regions' fourteen major central cities (Atlanta, Seattle, Dallas,
Houston, Detroit, and Phoenix) have fewer than 8,000 people per
square mile'05 and are thus less compact than Toronto's inner sub-
urbs.106 Four of those six (Atlanta, Dallas, Houston and Phoenix) have
96. Id.
97. See supra Part II-B.
98. Briffault, supra note 91, at 380; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest and the
Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing The Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J.
1985, 2002 n. 102 (2000) (showing how most affluent suburbs received disproportionate
amount of sewer funding in Minneapolis area).
99. See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and
Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 225 n. 27 (1999).
100. See supra Part II-C (at least some Toronto suburbs limit density through
regulation); LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1105-07 (describing American anti-density regulation).
101. Id. at 1105-06 (describing American regulation), supra notes 66-77 and
accompanying text (giving Canadian examples).
102. LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1118 (describing relationship between parking regulation
and density); Carol Goar, Home ownership within reach, TORONTO STAR, June 27, 2008, at 4,
2008 WLNR 12095121 (affordable housing advocates urge Toronto to relax minimum
parking requirements in order to increase the amount of affordable housing).
103. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 159.
104. LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1110-11.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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fewer than 4,700 people per square mile107 and are thus even less com-
pact than Toronto's outer suburbs.10 8 The overwhelming majority of
American suburbs are less compact than Toronto's suburbs. As noted
above, the average Toronto outer suburb has 4,700 people per square
mile 09 while all but one of the fourteen largest American regions has
fewer than 4,700 people per square mile.110
Because Sewell does not explore Canadian density regulation in
detail, it is not clear exactly why American suburbs are so much more
sprawling than Canadian suburbs. It may be that American land use
regulation is less aggressive, or it may be the case that other factors
(such as Toronto's excellent public transit system)1 1 favor more com-
pact suburban development in Toronto.
IV. SUMMARY
Sewell's book, despite its omissions, performs a valuable ser-
vice. Toronto has experienced considerable suburbanization despite its
high urban density and high transit ridership. It might be argued that
if even Toronto has experienced sprawl, free market forces will inevita-
bly lead to sprawl- but by discussing government support for suburbia
Sewell shows that in Canada, as in the United States, suburbia has
been a creature of politics.
107. LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1110-11.
108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. SEWELL, supra note 1, at 159.
110. LEWYN, supra note 6, at 1110-11. This statistic, of course, overestimates the density
of American suburbs, since the density figures for American urbanized areas includes both
cities and suburbs.
111. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting Toronto's high transit ridership
compared to other Canadian cities).
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